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. wf ate i from cur knowledge of order in tiie universe.
^t. i'honas aquinas aoes not seem to attempt to 
demonstrate the act and potency proposition in spite of his
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as is  seen from the o b jec tio n s  o f Hume. Froa Hesse's
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Qhkrtm om
A certain proposition, widely used by 3t. Thomas 
and Aristotle as a premise In scientific demonstrations 
will- be the subject of this thesis. Ircw an erawtnation 
of the proposition as used by those two philosophers, the 
oarpose of this Inquiry should become clear.
Let us look first to the works of Aristotle. The 
..hyai.cs of Aristotle leads ultimately to an unmoved movent. 
]?ooka VTI and VZZZ deal mainly with tie problem of demon* 
Pirating the existence of this movent. Aristotle begins 
with moving thingsi "Mow the existence of motion is
.1asserted by all who have anything to say about nature. To 
show that moving tilings need a movent, Aristotle supplies 
this further premise t ’’everything that Is in motion must be 
moved by something." The truth of this second proposition 
is not evident, however, and must be established by a 
demonstration.
Aristotle does this in a number of ways. Xt is in 
this context that the proposition, about which this thesis
^Aristotle, Physics, in The Works of Aristotle, ed.
»i. D. Hose (Oxford, 1935), viTTT (2&5b 15)* all quotations 
of and references to Aristotle in this paper are from this
edition.
2 Ibid. vll.l (241b 24).
1
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xt) concerned, arises, ^fter stating tii® above proposition, 
urretotle offers as proof: ' Y o r  if it (tiiat which is in
-.otionj is n o t  tns s o u r e e  of motion itself it is evident 
t u a t  it is aoved by somet.iing o't .er than i t s e l f . bis 
justification of tuis becomes clear ir» tae beginning of 
coo* VIII of ttre inyslcs. it is t*ab which is '’capable of 
i.Kjtion” wnich is moved. ror 11’ a thing begins t o  move "it 
xoiiowa fcixat before tne action in question, anotiier caange 
or cot ion must nave taken place in wibLch tnat wuicn was 
capable of being moved or causing motion had its becoming." 
And a similar line of reasoning must apply to a thing which 
comes to rest.*1
Ti.e proposition iiere expressed, which is used to 
j u s t i f y  the statement that everything wnicn is in motion 
must be moved by another, simply states that a being 
capable of motion must be acted u p o n  by "another change or 
m o t i o n . 11 later in the same book, Aristotle speaks on the 
same subject in terms o f  potentiality and actuality.^ That 
which is capable cl beingwmoved is potentially in motion, 
' m e  movent, tuat is, tirnt wnicn m o v e s ,  is already in 
a c t i v i t y :  "in fact, that which produces tue form is always
sorsething that possesses it." Cue potentially moveable,
3~
b u y s » v i i . l  1 >»
14 i b i d . v i i i . l  (2 5 7 b  7 - l f i *
^ ibid* viii.5 V257b 7-U>.
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3therefore, must be taoved by something aetual. Hence the 
fact that every being in notion oust be moved by another 
is clear* Xt is argued that (a) things are in notion} 
but (b) things capable of notion must be moved by something 
in a state of actuality} therefore, (c) whatever is in 
notion is moved by another.
St. Thomas begins his first proof of the existenee
of God in the sane tone as Aristotle's proof of the exist*
£
enoe of the first mover* Xt is evident from the senses 
that some things are in motion* Mere he adds that "owns 
autea good aovetur* ab alio move tor *w St. Thomas' first 
problem in the first part of the proof is the same as 
Aristotle's* to show that everything that is in motion is 
soved by another, it is not surprising that he uses a 
similar proposition to the one used in the Aristotelian 
demonstration previously examined. A thing which is moved 
is moved according as it is in potency. That which moves, 
lioves according as it is in act* Indeed, motion is the 
.reduction of a being from potency to act} *de poteatia autsm 
m n  potest allquid reduel in actum, nisi per aliouod ens in 
acta.* St. Thomas actually duplicates the Aristotelian 
demonstration on this point, though he seems to give a more
6 3*int Xnoua Aqulna*, 3«ni»tl Aaulytl*... £ge&
Thcoiogism * * , Matriti ^ /Madrid/*' Bibiiotheca de Auctores 
IViatianoa, /S35J.7 £  * . e textu eritieo leoniano * . j*/.
I, q. 2, a. 3, c*
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kprecise fora to the proposition: nothins can fee reduced
from potency to act except by a being already in act.
Although Aristotle, in the Phralca. does not seem
to formulate the proposition in terms quite as general as
those of St* Thomas, it is evident that his formulation,
i.e. "that which produces the form is always something that
possesses it,® certainly implies the proposition as stated
by St. Thomas. Moreover, as will fee seen in the next 
Tchapter, Aristotle, in Booh XX of the Metaphysics, in an 
extensive discussion of the nature of the potential and 
the actual, does formulate the proposition in terms which 
are almost identical to those used fey St. Thomas Aquinas.
Fro® the foregoing, it Is evident that the 
philosophies of feoth of these men coincide in that feoth of 
she® are attempting to demonstrate the existence of an on* 
isoved mover. Each of them accepts motion as an observed 
fact. Further, both attempt to demonstrate the proposition 
fciiat "everything that is in motion is moved fey another.”
To achieve this end, each brings in a proposition which 
states that a feeing potentially in motion must fee moved to 
actuality by a feeing which Is already in act. This latter 
proposition is Intricately involved in an important demon* 
ittratlem of the existence of a first mover. This, m
7
See below, p. 11.
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5itself, is enough to testify to the Inherent importance of 
the proposition, for to deny the validity of this statement 
is to deny the validity of the proofs.
This proposition is more than a tool in a 
demonstration of an unmoved mover. It is a unique expres­
sion of nature as seen by each of these sen. The whole of 
the Physic a and the f4etanhysics of Aristotle can be regarded 
hs a presentation of the order of things, from the lowest 
inanimate object, to the highest— the unmoved movents. In 
an absolute sense, the higher has more being that the lower. 
In relation to activity, it is the higher than sets on the 
lower. For the higher possesses actually what the lower 
possesses only potentially. Hence, to be reduced to 
actuality, the lower must be acted on by the higher. The 
same line of reasoning applies to the philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas. Most of his great works, such as the Summa 
faaolo&l&c and the sutama Contra Gentiles. begin with God 
and show how ail other being is ordered to this God, The 
relationship between the higher and the lower Is one in 
which the former is always acting on the latter and the 
highest being, God, would in effect act on all things.
Thus, the proposition, "no being in potency can be reduced 
to act except by a being In act” is at the very core of the 
philosophies of Ht. Thomas and Aristotle,
Kow, it is neoessary that the proof of the 
proposition be established; for without it, order in
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
6philosophy has little reason. That is, if things are not 
velated through higher beings actualizing the potencies of 
lower beings, it is difficult to see how there could be an 
order in things. To deny any relationship between the 
.lower and the higher is to m k m  every individual thing a 
little ‘island* of being responsible for its own actuality, 
i'or, if no being is dependent for its activity on another, 
all things oust be said to be self-subslstent in regard 
to their activity. A universe of sslf~subslstent beings, 
towever, is not a universe which implies order, it would, 
in fact, imply the opposites the activity of one being 
would be completely random in relation to the activity of 
another. Hence the truth of the aforementioned proposition 
is not only important, but necessary for the development of 
order in philosophy.
The purpose of this thesis is to consider whether 
the proposition *that which is in potency can be reduced to 
act only by a being in act* is demonstrable or noti and if 
so, tow it is to be demonstrated! if not, how the truth of 
the proposition cay be seen more clearly. This is not a 
textual study of the proposition as it appears In the 
writings of the two aforementioned philosophers. It is 
rather an attempt to Judge whether an important philosophic 
statement is, or is not, tame.
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In tii© second anu tnird caaptera we will consider 
tnis proposition as it is found in the works of Aristotle 
and it. Thomas Aquinas respectively. Hie nature of 
demonstration from first principles will be ttt* subject 
of the fourtn adapter, in the fifth chapter, I will 
exanine the act and potency proposition in respect to 
final causality. Separating this from the final adapter, 
in which tie proposition will be considered from the point 
of view of efficient causality, will be an examination of 
certain objections encountered in the writings of David 
Hume.
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CHAPTER TWO
Since toe proposition in question concerns set 
and potency, are will begin to# more detailed examination of 
Aristotle with a consideration of what he has to say on the 
potential and the actual. Although there are frequent 
references to act and potency throughout the works of 
Aristotle, perhaps his most explicit statement on the 
subject coses in the Metaphysics where almost all of Book 
IX is devoted to a consideration of the nature of potency 
and act.
Aristotle opens Book IX of the Metaphysics with
hi a discussion of the potential, he begins by pointing out
that potency can be understood in several ways.1 lie adds
that many of these may be neglected in his discussion of
the meaning of potency, although they are all related to a
primary type:
But all potencies that conform to the same type 
are originative sources of some kind, and are 
called potencies in reference to one primary 
kind of potency, which is an originative source 
of change In another thing or in the thing 
itself oua other.2
Kor instance, a potency for being acted on well mist be
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics ix.I (1046a 4 If*. 
c lbl--l. Ix.I \>iu46a 6-13;.
8
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9referred to a ‘'prior kind of potency, tuat is, a potency 
for being acted on, for the former assumes the latter.*^
The fundamental meaning of potency for Aristotle is, there­
fore, the capacity to change or to be changed. A body at 
rest is said to hare the capacity to novel a cold body is 
able to be warns, Potency signifies the capacity of a thing 
to change or be changed.
Aristotle describes the activity of a thing by 
developing a contrast with potency.1 A man who is capable 
of studying science Is contrasted to the man who is 
studying science. From this, It Is evident that the act 
is the fulfilment of the potency.5 involved in the tran­
sition from potency to act is charge or motion.^ For 
example, building is required in the construction of a 
house. Xt is not, however, the motion which is described 
by the term *aeb*t "for every motion Is incomplete—  
making thin, learning, walking, building." In the building 
of a house, the act is the end; that Is, the house Itself, 
rather than the motion, i.e. the building, which is an 
incomplete act. There are cases in Which the motion and
n i M i i i < n m N M W M m n M M »  \
3 Metaph. ix.I (WM5a 17).
k Ibid. ix.6 (lot8a 25 ff«).
5 ibid. lx.6 (lo48a 35), "The thing that stands in
contrasi' tb each of these 2 *  aatn capable of studying, etc.7 
exists actually. There the actual is the fulfilment of 
the potential, in that the contrast to a capacity must 
always be the fulfilment of that capacity.”
6 Ibid. ix.6 (U#8b 18 ff.).
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end are ono. Such is the case with seeing, (tbs notion)
and sight (tbs act) which occur siwiiltaasoualy. Only la
cases such as this can the notion he referred to as aa act*7
It follows that in ths very definitions of the
terms 'act' and 'potency', a kind of relationship is set up
between the two* That is, in defining a potency, one must
do so with the recognition of a corresponding act. For
Instance, to say that an object is capable of notion destands
a prior knowledge of actual action. Xt is for this reason
that Aristotle can may that actuality is by definition
prior to potency!
* . , for that which Is in the primary sense 
potential is potential because it is possible for 
it to bee©me active . . .  so that the formula and 
knowledge of the one oust precede the knowledge 
of the other.0
Hence, Aristotle regards act as prior to potency in the 
sense that the knowledge of the potential depends on a 
prior knowledge of the actual.
Though the truth of this stateeent is apparent, 
it does not illuaine the proposition that no being can be 
reduced froa potency to act except by a corresponding act. 
dimply to say that we know an act before we know Its cor­
responding potency, and that we speak of the latter in 
teres of the former, does not necessarily indicate a causal
7 *»*aph. ix.6 (lo46b 33).
8 Ibid, ix.8 (lukgb 13).
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IX
connection between them. What Aristotle has developed in
tnis place Is a contrast between set and potency end very
little ©ore. For, because our knowledge of the actual is
first in the order of understanding, this does not mean
that the actual is first in the real order of things* To
assert this would be imposing the order in which the Bind
functions, that is, a logical order, on the real order,
an imposition for which there may be no Justification* Xt
is knowledge that oust conform to reality, not reality to
knowledge* Hence, the problem of a causal relationship
between potency and act is, as yet unsolved*
Aristotle goes on to show that act is not only
prior by definition, but that it is also prior in sequence
cr in tJUse. He wants to show that before a being in
potency can be reduced to act, there must be a real being
in act. To explain this, Aristotle points out that a man
sust be produced by another mam
From the potentially existing the actually exist* 
ing is always produced by an actually existing 
thing, a man by a man • • • there is always a first 
mover and the mover always exists actually*'*
here we find Aristotle using the proposition that a poten­
tial being is made actual by an actual being! that is, it is 
reduced to act by a being in act. It seems in this instance
that Aristotle is using a causal proposition, *froa the
Meta ph. ix.S (10*9b 23).
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12
potentially existing, the actually existing is always 
produced fey an actually existing tiling,w to deaonstrate 
that act ausfc fee prior to potency in time. For if, as the 
causal proposition states, act is by nature prior to potency 
-t must also fee prior in sequence or tiiae.
Aristotle does not » m m  to attempt to prove this 
causal proposition, but Merely uses it as a premise in 
uother proof. Is as,justified in ais use of this propo- 
cation? It would seen tost a proposition, which states a 
reiatlonsaip between two things, should point to something 
on which this relationship is based. The problem here is 
bust Aristotle, in allowing this proposition to stand on its 
own terns, seems to fee assuming the relationship. Or, be# 
cause he does not refer it to anything orior for its 
justification, the possibility of the proposition feeing 
self-evident arises. Aristotle does not, however, show 
i»ow the relationship is evident. And thus the original 
problem remainss Is the statement, 1 every feeing in potency 
can fee reduced to act only fey a feeing in sot*, true?
This problem applies not only to the proposition 
stated above but it also applies to a number of more 
specific propositions used fey Aristotle that derive their 
validity fro® the one based on act and potency. For 
example, ’’everything that come* to be, cooes to fee fey the 
agency of something,** a proposition widely used in Booh VII
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
13
qx the Metaphysics, Is simply a more specific ass of the 
act and potency proposition*lu that is, it is tits sans 
proposition tut In less universal terms* Similarly in 
Books VII and VIII of tue fnyslos. we nave seen that 
Aristotle employs the set and potency proposition to snow 
that whatever is in motion is in motion Because of the 
agency of the movent.11 Since the proof of this proposition 
depends on the truth of the act and potency proposition, a 
truth which has not yet Seen made clear, judgment con­
cerning the existence of a prime movent oust he deferred 
for the present.
let us turn to Aristotle’s discussion of notion 
In Book VIII of the Physics for the purpose of justifying 
the proposition, 'a being in potency can he reduced to act 
only by a being in set*. Aristotle, in his proof of the 
existence of a first mover, begins by saying that a being 
in motion requirea a mover. To show the validity of this 
statement he points out that a being which comes into 
motion must be brought into motion by a being whleh is 
already in act, that is, by a moving thing or movent. 
Aristotle defines motion as Hthe fulfilment of the moveable 
insofar as it is moveable.”12 For the Stagirlte this
10 Metaoh. vli.T (lo32a 12).
1 1 Flys, vii.l (341b 24 f£),
12 Ibid. viil.l (2^ la 9j* See also Phya. vill.5
(25Tb 7 ) 7 "
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Ik
usatetaent mean* that "in eaen kind of motion It is that 
which la capable of motion that la in motion."3^  He later 
aids that,
. . .  the moveable is moved and this is potentially, 
not actually, in motion, but the potential is in 
process to actuality • . , the,movent, on the other 
hand, is already in activity,**
In support of these statements, Aristotle offers a propo-
sit ion that we have already scent "that which produces the
form is always some thins that possesses it.”1-*
this argument gives a good insight to Aristotle's
view on act and potency. By examining a being which at m e
moment lacks motion and then in another moment acquires
motion, Aristotle points out that in the former case the
being must have had the capacity for motion, that is, It
mat have been potentially In motion, whereas in the latter
instance we have an actually moving being. Aristotle must
go on to snow how this change took place. There would seem
to be two possible conclusions to this problems that the
acquired motion was caused by the thing itself that moved
or that it was caused by another being.*6 However, it is
13 Pfaar». *111.1 (251* 13). 
w  IWa. *111.5 (25Tb T). 
x5 Ibid. *111.5 <257!» 9).
16 1*14. *11.1 (241. 25).
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unthinkable that a thing "should in its entirety move it* 
self . , ,! thus it would at the same time be both teaching 
and being taught, or restoring to and being restored to the 
same health,"1? The thesis that a tiling might be responsible 
for its own motion then falls into absurdity18 and it would 
appear that the second thesis must be ehosent that every* 
tiling that is in motion must be moved by another,
Let ua examine this argument closely. It states 
that since a being must be considered incapable of moving 
itself, it must be moved by another. Furthermore, the 
reason that a being is incapable of moving Itself is that 
it lacks motion.1^ Benoe it would seem apparent that the 
being which is the cause of its motion must already possess 
notion; that is, a mover mist be a movent.
Is this argument satisfactory? If it is, by 
showing that every thing in motion demands a movent, it
17 Pfrrs. viii.5 (257b 2).
18 s** Phy*. viii.5 (257b 12). It is important to 
remember here that the moveable is only potentially 
moveable and must derive its fulfilment from something 
actually in motion. Bence even if a thing appears to move 
itself, it is clear that one part of this thing must move 
another.
1 **
* This is the key question in the argument of
Aristotle* that motion can only be caused by that which 
lb in motion. If this statement is true, then the rest 
of the argument follows.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
15
sa / .asily be argu. 1 Wit w e  actualization of i being in 
rcter.cy iemands a toeing in act.2u Eat, doe# every being in 
?;oUi m  demand a mover? We mast further Inquire into tne 
reason beuind this statement* ;»'or, to state Wut a tuing 
potentially in motion simply points out tr.at the thing 
ear move* Similarly, to state tt at a being nas the corres- 
pan ung act merely mean a that W e  being is an motion. But, 
to state that a being in potency car. be reduced to act only 
cj a ceing in act connects act ani aotency causally. The 
first two statements axe matters of observation, but the 
final proposition, wnicn connects tae two terms, demands 
some sort of Justification. In regard to things wnich move 
(from potency to actj, Aristotle gives two possibilities:
Wat the thing either moves itself or is moved by another.
i owever, in view of what has just been said, it would see®
that tnere la a third possibility: that there is no causal
relation between act and potency} i.e. that a being can be 
in motion with no mover at all,2A
Aristotle does not entirely ignore this problem in 
the Physics. In tne first chapter of Book VIII, he attacks 
tne- notion held by some of his predecessors that motion is 
rot eternal, but rather can vanish and reappear.22 "nature,”
2o dee below, p. 58.
cx Bee below, p. tyj.
*2 Phyg. viii.l (2pfc. 1 ££,) .
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Aristotl* points out, "Is everywhere the causa of order*“ 
tnat is, "that which is produced or directed by nature can 
never be anything disorderly.” Aristotle goes on to show 
that to hold that a notion may cone to be without there 
being a previous notion is incomputable with the above 
statements
But if we say that there is first a state of rest 
for an infinite tine, and then notion is started 
at sons moment, and that the fact that it is 
this rather thrn sons previous nonent is of no 
importance, and involves no order, then we can 
no longer say that it is nature*s work.**3
In this teat, Aristotle is examining the possibility that
i. thing nay begin to move without there being a preceding
activity to account for this notion, in which case, there
Mould be no order involved. This would not be a natural
covenant, for "nature is everywhere the cause of order."
Whether Aristotle regards this as a demonstration 
of the eternality of motion or not is not explicitly in­
dicated. An examination of the text which follows, however, 
Mould see® to indicate that the eternality of notion is 
demonstrable, he points out that:
It would be better, therefore, to say with 
Empedocles and anyone else who nay have aaln- 
taisssd such a theory as his jfthat a notion any 
cone to be with no preceding notion? that the 
universe is alternately at rest and in notion:
23 JSaa* viii.l (252a 13 - 17).
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for in « system of thi« kind no nave at ones ft 
certain order. But even here the holder of the 
theory ought not only to assert the faets he 
ought also to explain the cause of it» i,e. 
he should not tasks any sere assumption or lay 
down any gratuitous axiom, but should employ ^  
either induetire or demonstrative reasoning,"**
Although this text is primarily intended as a criticism of
Empedocles, one fact seems dear: the solution to the
problem can be reasoned to. Aristotle later adds in the
aaro* critique that,
. . • while his theory is right insofar as it is 
applied to certain individual oases, he is wrong 
in asking it of universal application, thus, a 
triangle always has its angles equal to two right 
angles, but these is nevertheless an ulterior cause 
for the eternity of this truth, whereas first _  
principles are eternal and have no ulterior cause."**'
t.iere are then certain truths which are eternal but should
not be laid down as first principles! the reason for this
being that these truths have an ulterior cause and hence,
can be demonstrated from that cause.
In view of what has Just been said, it would seen
that Aristotle*a proposition, that every notion which comes
to be requires a preceding motion, Js such a truth} that is,
it is eternally true but it is not a first principle sines
there is an ulterior cause for its truth. And this ulterior
cause would appear to be order or its cause, nature. Since
every reduction from potency to act is a kind of motion, then
24 SEE- (252a 20),
25 Xbld. viil.l (252b 1).
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' seen that cvery sue), re duction demands a preceding
■ - ■* *
This isay, nowever, be pushing tee Aristotelian 
text too far, for as we have seen, he loco not seem to use 
k aeh a proof in his specif].-.: references to act and potency.
;c, since, in tnis .Instance, Aristotle is referring to 
•cotton and since the reduction fro;.’ potency to act is so 
ioseiy connected with motion, it would be reasonable to 
• o lude that the act tn! potency proposition was not re­
garded by ‘ristotle as a first principle. It woul7 further 
appear that the key to this problem might be found through 
; study of nature arid order, be will first, aowaver, turn 
to the writings of the great mediaeval pnilosopner and 
tueologian -/no al,o made constant use of the principle 
*iio bo ’.ny in potency .-an be reduced to act except by a
~ t L . -  i  H. i O  O  .
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In the first chapter, it y&s seen that St. Thesis' 
onilosophy, like that of Aristotle, was very much dependent 
on order. While realising on the one hand that the world 
is fall of different grades of beings, St. Thoms saw on 
the other that these beings were all related In some way 
and that all of them bore some resemblance to beings of 
other order*.1 As a result his philosophy accounts for 
all beings In one order. Intricately involved in his 
philosophy are certain propositions which are expressive 
of this carder. The proposition in question, that nothing 
can be reduced from potency to act except by a being in 
act. Is one of these propositions.
It is now necessary to inquire in detail into 
the writings of St. Thomas in order to discover in what way 
'm amices use of the proposition and, of even greater Im­
portance, to ascertain whether tiur* is, in his writings,
* M M a « w « M w w i a a N M W l i l i |
. 1 a s -  Thsol. I, A7, 3, c. . dlcendmn quod lose
ordo in rebus sic a Deo ereatls existeasT unitatea mundi
I^ Te^ iirtaius enim * i sfeu^ afS^ 'unitate ' WSmis.
*Wr&l3i' 'SRHrarfg*  ^ ^ e  a l m g
fheol. I. 11. 5. c. *Qenia enla quae sunt, invenluntur 
Issee ordinate ad invleea. ' hum' auaedae culbuadaB aeservlunt•w
•sja-«iio S c rse n : L u .  '
ordo consldcrsnduain rebus. ifaus. quo aliauid oresturn 
!?rainatur .3 iJliid .... .. Uio»orf<>. quo omit
20
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
21
any indication of whether tuas proposition can be demon­
strated, and if bo, aow it is to be demonstrated* With 
regard to his use of the proposition, it has been seen that 
it m s  employed by it. Thoms in his proof of the existence 
of God in the iutama Xheolo^iae,^ a passage that closely
2 Joseph Owens, G. "The Problem of the Prima Via,’*
; odern Schoolman, XXX ( 1 j52), pp. 33-53 (fart I), father 
Owens, wnen he considers the first premise in the first way 
of demonstrating the existence of God, i.e. that which is 
moved is moved by another, states that Jt. Thomas does not 
accept this proposition in any "a priori way", but rather 
that m  concludes it from "wnat is seen happening in the 
sensible world." it. f.iomas, he points out, uses the ex­
ample of "wood wnich is cold . . . being heated by fire," 
to derive this proposition.* "Insofar as the wood is being 
moved from cold to heat, it is in potency to being hot.
This is at once seen to be a necessary condition for being 
moved. The thing tiiat is being moved has to be in potency 
to taat towards which it is being moved. That which is im­
parting the motion, on the otner iuuid, must be actual in 
inis respect,"
It is at this point ti*ai the problem arises. While it 
i* true tiiat a moving tiling is changing f r o m potency to act 
and tiiat before a thing can actually have a certain act, it 
must nave the capacity for taut act, there is still no grounds 
for relating potency to act causally* The act and potency 
proposition not only expresses the meaning of potency and 
act, but it also relates them in a special way. If we 
assume this relationship, tuen any analysis of the propo­
sition need only be a definition of the terms. And tills is 
want Father Owens seems to have done, lie analyzes motion 
in terms of potency and act assuming that potency is re­
lated to act causally, hence the basis for the solution 
of the problem is, for ratner- Owens, that act must be 
"cometiling over and above potency, something ©ore than 
potency," and also that act 'has to come fro© something 
Wiiica already aaa or is tiiat act." Trie problem with this is 
tne same as above: that act is something above potency is
clear from a definition of the terms but the final state- 
sent Is one that implies a relationship, and doe® not 
necessarily follow from a definition of tm  terms.
it must be seen uere that in a very real sense the 
statement that rather Owens analyzes as the basis of the 
proposition that ’everything that is in motion is moved 
by another* is no more than tiiat proposition in terms of
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araiiela a similar demonstration In Aristotle's Physics.3 
ol. Tlioreas, however, does not by any means restrict his 
employment of this proposition to this question. For 
example, we find the proposition used in answering the 
question: ’Whether God is a Body?"
decundo, quia neeeaae est id quod est primum 
ens, esse in actu, et nulio rrodo in potentla. 
ulcet enirn in uno et eodem quo! exit de potentla 
in actum, prius sit potentla qoam actus tempore, 
aimpliciter tamen actus prior est potentla: 
quia quo a est in potentla, non reducltur in 
actum nisi per ens actu. Gstensum est autea 
supra quod deus est oriasua ens. Xmpossibile est 
igltur quod In ieo sit uliquid in potentla.
Omno autem corpus est in potentla: quia con­
tinuum, inquantum huiusmodi, divlaibile est in 
infinitum* impossicile est igitur Deum esse 
corpus.4*
fnis proof is a very simple and a very convincing 
one. God is known to he the first of all beings (primum 
ens). And since act is prior to potency, it must be said 
that there can be no p o t e n c y  in God. It follows therefore 
tiiat, since every bo iy is in potency, God cannot be con­
sidered to be a body. The only part of this proof that seems
act and potency. In this sense tnen tue 'basis* and tne 
proposition are one. Hence if we assume this basis or this 
relationship between potency raid act to arrive at the pro­
position 'that which is in motion is moved by another*, then 
we are actually assuming this latter proposition in the be­
ginning. because Father Owens In fact has not explained the 
relationship between potency and act, the problem remains 
unsolved.
3 Phya. vii.l (24 lb 24 ff>;.
** 4ug» fheol. I, 3, 1,
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no require explanation Is the statement that in the absolute 
mense, aet Is prior to potency* at* Thomas explains this 
lay saying that In the reduction from potency to act, there 
must first be a being in act: "quod est in potentla. non
reducltur in actum nisi per ens aetu.”
Again, as in the demonstration of the existence of 
Godt, at. Thomas uses the act and potency proposition as tbs 
nole basis for a demonstration.$ Without the use of this 
proposition there is no demonstration at all. There is 
also, as in the aforementioned demonstration, no explanation 
given concerning the use of this proposition. Can it be 
concluded from this that no explanation is necessary? That 
is, since, in these two Important demonstrations, the pro­
position stands on its own, it would see© that it might be
./cgarded by St. Thomas as a self-evident or per se nota
proposition. Let us first, however, consider some other 
Instances In which this proposition is used.
St. Thomas makes use of the act and potency pro­
position In his treatise on the intellectual powers of the 
soul in the Susans Theoloalae on a question concerning the 
agent intellect. He has previously shown that in order to 
iunderstand a thing it is necessary that we have a possible 
intellects6 that Is, a knowing power which is capable of
5 3«« Sum. Thcol. I. 2, 3, c.
6 Ibid. X, 79, 2, c.
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knowing prior to the act of knowledge, The problem now
becooes to show that we also need an agent intellect to
actualize the possible intellect. The possible intellect
arrives at knowledge by acquiring the forms of natural things.
But since the forms of natural things do not themselves
exist apart from matter, there must be an active principle
to raise these forms to the possible intellect*
• • • formae antes in «ateri& exlstentes non stmt 
Intelliglblles aetu* sequebatur quod naturae seu 
formae rerun sensibiliun, quas intelligimus, non 
assent Intelliglblles actu. Nihil auten redueitur 
de potentla in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actus 
sicut sen sue fit in aetu per seitslbllle in actu. 
Oportebat Igitur ponere ailquam virtutea ex parte 
intelleetus. quae faeeret mtelllglbllla in actu, 
per abstractions* speelerwa a conditlonibus 
materlaXlbus, it haee est necessitas ponendi 
Intellectual agentem.*
This demonstration provides an excellent exaaple 
of the absolute necessity given to this proposition. We 
know that we have the capacity to know various things. It 
is, however, necessary to explain how we acquire these things 
as knowledge. That is, it is necessary to explain how what 
is potentially known becomes actually known. And since the 
object of knowledge is itself, prior to the act of knowing, 
not actually intelligible, then the object Itself cannot be 
the sole cause of knowledge. For the acquisition of a fens 
by the Intellect is a reduction free potency to act, and 
since "nihil autem redueitur de ootentia in actum. nisi
7 I&SS&" 79, 3, c.
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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ser allquod m m  acta." Uv&n there aunt be posited a power 
d u i n h Is In act which can cause the sensible species to 
become intelligible. It should be noted here that although 
the demonstration is pointing to a power of which aost 
people would be entirely unaware, dt. Thomas is not positing 
simply a guess or a probability, but rather a necessity: 
f,it haee est necesaitas oonendl intellectua agentem."
The whole demonstration rests, as did the one in 
m i l o n it was seen that God could not be a body, on the 
proposition that nothing can be reduced f r o m potency to act 
except by a being in act. As in the other demonstration, it 
is used as though it were a first principle or per se nota 
proposition. If the proposition is true then the conclusion 
must be true; but if the proposition is either not true, or 
if the truth of the proposition is not yet properly esta* 
blisned, then the demonstration cannot be regarded as true 
or at least as properly established.
Are these demonstrations offered by dt. Thomas 
sound? In other words, is he justified in positing the 
existence of an active power simply because he is aware of 
a potential one. It would seem, from the way in which it. 
Thomas uses the proposition, tiiat he is accepting it as 
evident. At least, the absence of any explanation for his 
use of the proposition would lead one to conclude that he 
supposed that no explanation was needed.
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
' ‘3391
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Is Gt. Thomas justified in treating tnis as a per 
sc nota proposition? It sight be objected that the real 
reason for tne acceptance of this proposition is that with­
out it, the reduction from potency to act would, in a sense, 
ci’y intelligibility. For instance, without positing an 
ngent intellect the process of knowing Is not intelligible, 
for it cannot be seen now the object potentially known be­
comes actually known. To posit an active power in this case 
renders the process intelligible. However, this, in itself, 
does not Justify the use of the proposition. For, simply, 
because something must be true according to the order in 
wuich the intellect functions, it is not necessarily true 
outside of tiiat order, that is, in the piiysical order, 
fuerefore the relationship between this proposition and the 
aysic&l order is not yet established, what is clear is 
uiat the proposition is closely linked with it. Thomas* 
view of the real order.
ve see evidence of this in his demonstration of
fitue existence of God. In the first proof,v he points out 
i.iiat there is an order of movers and things moved. That 
union is in act moves that which Is in potency to a state of
'.duality. In another proof,- ne speaks of order in terms
of causality. That which has being is tne cause of being.
k  hum. Theol. I, 2 ,  3* JFrlma Via7.
' ffcld. I, 2, 3, /Secunda Via?.
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And again, in another p r o o f , h a  sees an order of perfec­
tion in things. Certain things are more perfect and other 
things are less perfect. The m e  of the terms were and 
less indicates a relationship between things, and nenae, 
order. In fact his *proofs* for the existence of God can 
be taken as comprising a whole; that is, one proof, in 
which an order In things is seen, an order which leads to a 
first mover or first cause or a first In whatever parti­
cular order soy be under consideration.
in the writings of sit, fttomas, as in the works of 
Aristotle, carder seems to be tnat wnich opposes random 
activity of any wort.-1* Eandom activity Implies that 
activity of a being which has no relation to any other 
being. In this sense then, a motion can be considered 
random If it is caused by nothing, and if it is aovlng to­
wards nothing. Order, on the other hand, in opposing random 
activity, implies an activity which bears a relation to some 
other. In this way, St. Thomas* proof of the existence of 
God is a proof based on orders the relation of moved to 
irovent, effect to cause and less perfect to more perfect.
10 3 m , Theol. I, 2, 3, Quarts Via?.
See p. 5.:, footnote 1. In these texts we can clearly 
see tiiat for St. Thomas order implies relations "Secundum 
quo:! qaaeiur. ad ali.it ox^lnantur. In the highest sense, 
order can be eonaiderefc "quo omnia create ordinantur in 
vejK." These texts seem to'excess-'clearly 1 the "'idea''tKat 
order is opposed to anything random.
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In an article concerning; the unity of God, 3t« 
Tx-ossaa hag occasion to refer to the order in nature. In 
this particular article ne wants to enow t.-at God, toe 
cause of all things, must be one. fo this end, he points 
out tnat.
Omnia eni© quae sunt, inveniuntur esse ordinata
a h  i n v l c e c ,  i u m  q u u e i a a  qaibusdsua deeerviunt.
Quae antes diverse sunt, in unum ordinem non con-
venirenfc, nisi ab allquo uno ordinarentur.12
u-uot, therefore, be a aid tuas. God i & one.
This partlcul-i' article bsar$ some examination.
'w. «. * tuv i j w > a *w cuuv a l l  are
, x . a  ... • 4is j O c 44 -ss vc ■ - - ^ v4-4  ^c  s>Vs wkt-isw- — v -44v a f i v |  b u t
ly says that? V.uniu %-r.ia; quae cunt Inyrnluntur c-ase 
:il:\ata ad m y  Ice*,. dia <^ ua.edah qulbusdum de3ervlunt." 
decondly, it is seen mat mecc things are 'diverse • •
''.^ alh, this la pres usably ar. obvious fact that needs no 
'ife-sonstration. But diverse things need to be ordered by 
u k  cause, This, for our- purposes, is the Important state* 
:.i nt in toia text. For we have here, it would seem, an 
upplication of a proposition, similar to the act and potency 
{.reposition, as a cause for order in diverse things. To be 
c ause of order is to give soite thing an act, timt is, to
...eve aoroething fro© potency to act. hence tiie reduction
. . v 1 . 1 4 .  x ^ .. 4 ->! 44 ne c u o x  or^er*
ia Sum. Tneol. I, 11, 3, c.
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This is, admittedly, a rather liberal interprc- 
* it ion of the text. It does, however, imply that there 
must be a cause for order. And how else could one arrive 
at this conclusion without regarding ‘ordering• as the 
p ’ving and reception of some activity. At least this muou 
is cleart the proposition that * all things are in order* 
is dependent on a prior proposition, for it Is evident taat 
C'Vier is caused, since order is the giving of an act or 
the reducing from potency to act, it can be seen that this 
prior proposition must say that ‘every reduction from potency 
to net is caused*. It further follows that the cause must 
itself be in act for nothing can cause that which it itself 
lacks. It would seeia tnen that Gt. Thomas would regard the 
act -ini potency proposition as prior to the statement tiiat 
"all things that exist are ordered.'*
‘jet us conclude with a brief resume of the position* 
cf Aristotle «nd it. Thomas. Although Aristotle made very 
little use of the -reposition in question in terms of act 
a’-'d -otency, he dii make frequent use of a number of other 
prepositions which could be referred to as particular in­
stances of the more general statement. It was further seen 
t,\nt in moat Instances, Aristotle use * these propositions 
without demonstrating them, although in one text he did in- 
Gj.catc that from a knowledge of order it could be seen that
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•*very motion mast be caused.*3
Unlike Aristotle, It. Thomas makes frequent use 
cf tne proposition, *no being can bo reduced from potency 
to act except by a feeing In act*. In ir-ost caaes, however, 
i does not make any attempt to Justify the usage of this 
proposition, beyond defining the terras* And in the text 
Vi':> 1 ch 4© have Just examined, he Indicates that order, rather 
t >r< being prior to the act and potency proposition, is 
4 •:usei by it.
In general, there is, I believe, one criticism 
that could be justly levelled at these two philosophers: 
both failed to consider as a serious possibility the ehal- 
Iv-.y;-'- of the sceptic, i.e. the reduction from potency to .act 
w.d.eh Is uncaused. That this problem does not occur to thea 
&- •: serious one Is evident in the statement used by both of 
t'.e rc men that *v:ir-.tcver is !n '-otlor; Id either moved by it* 
r. If or is caov" 1 by another * • This statement rests on the 
a.: eumptlon that the motion of anything that is in motion is 
caused. ran this assumption be made? t?c must first take 
irto consideration that the motion might be uncaused.
The second problem '.van uo:? ic m  arrive at- the 
kuo/ledge of tnis proposition? Is It a first principle or 
c ;a it be demonstrated? As we have seen, tills question does 
not eeetn to have been answered clearly by either Aristotle 
or St. Thomas.
13 see above, pp. 16-17*
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That the act and potency proposition plays an 
Important role in tne philosophies of Aristotle and St* 
Thomas is evident from tne texts we have considered* Both 
of these philosophers see* to infer that in describing an 
ordered universe, a proposition of this nature mast be 
accepted* It has not been seen, however, whether either of 
them regarded this proposition as a first principle or a 
eta tenant susceptible of demonstration* for the most part 
they seen to accept the proposition on its face value*
There is, in the Phrslea of Aristotle, a ease in 
wnicto notion seems to be the necessary result of order 
Order implies relation or connection* That Is, what is 
ordered is not random* It can be seen, however, that random 
cotlon (or any random activity) cannot be caused activity, 
for causality relates an effect to a cause* Hence, every 
action, indeed every activity, must be caused* Froo this, 
it follows that every reduction from potency to act oust be 
caused by a being in act* In this my, then, it follows 
that since the universe is ordered, any change or notion 
must be referred to a cause*
This argument, however, could be reversed. If we
1 See above, p* 17.
31
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bo.pln w ith  any re d u c tio n  fro t* potency to  a c t ,  I t  fo llo w s  
t.^at tt ic re  must be some kind o f  m otion o r  change and, I f
;z say t's-at in any redaction from potency to act, there must 
ve a cause wuie». Is itself I r act, tnen it follows that 
'"•.•cry oiotlon or c xnre in t*-#' universe is related to another 
iV.otlon or But tnlr is the type of activity
■‘/■Jiau xS referre I to as ordere *, .isnce, we pay begin with 
ice .and potency proposition and arrive it trie fact that 
a.ii-iays must do ordered.
x.xis argument, aeeais to ta k e  on a c i r c u la r  c h ar*  
i . ' te r *  I f  we begin w ith  o rd e r, wo are  in e v ita b ly  le d  to  t t e  
fo rm u la tio n  o f t.vc a c t and potency o r >y o u ic io n , .»e can,
. ,/o'voi', cegiii .«l v>• i v.it. a c t an-i potency prodosxexon and, in  
way, a iT iV e  a t  o rder; i . e .  t».e a w  and potency 
to  -a& ition  deuonstrute-; in  tno f i r s t  argument can be turned  
ax jo in  and used to  iemonsjtrate tae very tit^n^ tn a t was used
w  , \J i . i i  wl . 1  b t *  i .  b  •
U k i  U O  V * i S  V f O X “ w t i  O i  |
utw .<o* J.  ^w rfa-iii iiiiyu CQilO&FrLift^  OXX*CtiX&X,>
’.uii.cd 11 i> io i wii’* Ox' -djd.i,/vi do « i. w tu w? QtiX»wO 0 -LGdLX*
"* —  ., i.   tf. II.-.— .— .■ *
xur arguiaciiit does no t con*
■ ■ w  *v - i  W O ' -a t * *C  bi '« i  t  l O l  1 •
Now vJsj.iOii).uiib wc 0-.LLiC'i Oil premxs*jes
prior to  and o e t te r  known than tne conclusion;
Xtu w.it* w_u.iL; u iu i^ ii cxnrxii sxsfc*i t<xii©ously be both  
■rior and p o s te r io r  to  one a n o th e r: so c i r c u la r
wx awLwii lu  uxC'SLi xy no t possxbie in  th e  
u n q u a lif ie d  sense o f  d e m o n stra tio n .
^  •*- - - T , V  ^  A  . .. 4_ •  - " , . ~t . - . . : _ . ’ ■' '“/ IP _•t — =-J tv i* -L'- j X'*j f 1/1  ^ ^  ^ *” ^  ^*
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irfchermore, It follows that tf neither the premise nor the 
‘occlusion Is prior to tne other, this ”theory reduces to
t-i>e mere statement that if i thing exists then it must 
exist— an easy sny of ^roving any thing..-I hat actually 
oens in a circular orguraent In that the premise must lie 
•. It :ciy toe identified with the conclusion.
fonseruently, insofar as the relation of act and 
„ nay to order is concerned, we are left with the follow* 
i.ap problem: can either one be demonstrated fro® tne other?
.•or is is clear from vrnat Aristotle has said tnat botn can* 
:,.au be at the same time demonstrated fron, and used to demon­
strate tae other. .m are, therefore, left with three 
.>ws.^ oilitics of .-mien only one can be chosen: first, that
Owi- ur-lersi-uriing of act ana potency _c prior to our under- 
..ca:,cijig of order ana taac tne latter must be demonstrated 
from uiie former; or secondly, tiiat our unaerstanding of 
ox- J«r is prior to our understanding of act ana potency and 
.. a; be used to demonstrate tne act and potency proposition; 
cm thirdly, taut neititer act ana potency nor order are prior 
to the otner in which case c«ey must ue identified,
r *iore pyx.rig into tuts problem at greater length, 
r-.-c us> again tnouire into tae os ter for Analytics anu con* 
cider what Aristotle says on propositions and demonstrations, 
ww&ra* cue Beginning °f tula wora, arxscotie summarises his
•3 lost. Anal. 1.3 (72b 3A /.
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own position concerning demonstration* "our own doctrine is 
that not ail knowledge is demonstratives on the contrary, 
Icnowledge of the ismedlate premisses is Independent of 
(lemons tratlon.
Concerning premisses which cannot he demonstrated, 
Aristotle points oat that "an immediate proposition is one 
which has no ether proposition prior to it."5 Further,
'the premisses of demonstrated knowledge mist be true, 
primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the 
conclusion. To be better known can be understood in two 
senses s better known in the order of reality and better 
Icnown to man. The former Is mare universal and furthest 
fro® sense while the latter is particularly nearest to
isense.7
We mist distinguish between realities in the world 
and propositions in the intellect. Simply because a certain 
proposition seems to facilitate explanation does not neces­
sarily mean that it truly explains the world of reality.
For instance, the proposition 'all thing# are ordered*, any 
lead to conclusions which are invalid because the proposition 
i!iay not he a correct expression of order in the world. On
4 !a»£* **3 (72b 18}.
5 Ibid. 1.2 (72a Sj.
6 Ibid. 1.2 (71b 2u}.
7 Ibid. 1.2 (71b 34}.
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the other hand, if the proposition in the Intellect is an 
expression of things in the world, then its conclusions 
teust folios as true, Similarly, set arid potency may he 
round both in the world or in a proposition in the intellect, 
hence a preposition is an intellectual expression. Before 
it can he used in a valid demonstration its truth as 
expressive of the real world mist he established.®
Consequently, with regard to order vla*a*vla act* 
;md-potency, if one is to be demonstrated from the other, it 
isust be shown that the proposition of one is prior to and 
better known than the proposition of the other| that is, one 
proposition must be more universal than the other. And in 
this context, that which would seem to be referred to is 
i;hat which is prior and better known in the least qualified 
way.^ If neither of these propositions can be regarded as 
immediate, it would seem that there must be another props* 
iiition prior to these from which each may be demonstrated.
Bow do we arrive at the first and immediate 
ixretslsses? Our knowledge of those is, according to Aristotle 
neither innate nor is it derived from any higher state of 
icnowledge. We must, then, arrive at our knowledge of these
8 Post. Anal. 1.2 (Tib 24).
"■ Ibid. i.2 (72a I). *. . ♦ objects nearer to sense are
in*ior anSTSetter known to taanj objects without qualification 
fsrior and better known are those further froo sense. How 
the most universal causes are furthest from sense and
particular causes are nearest to sense.8
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ti.rougn sensation. ^  dense knowledge, however, is trie know*
io.ige of tss par Cac alar. »aC.» i’tsgurd vo t**i6  point, Aristotle 
. •. vwjs tnoUt,*. &**« act vi wentc perceptiAW. as oi u e
-11 1/^LUiai ( — VAC w.C/iitS»i.. i. i ti iiA'^AS Uitiit, 1 Of £Ai4tiplS, IXOt
 ^* - v. t sjA i ■ AtA aJl-a-ah. .t *. a oi* , Aw vAi wi.«. 4 - vJ co 4 x *a s t o t lei, cor o yf er y
. aiA,,j>i*4iwAi'y U*"ii.VtiAasAAO. A;.-w siiUol OO UlitJU to iATi'AVtt At WiOfS
. •■'u w-ii cuitCwj - ' U v i  i»Uvi- aa ini.c concept ox Ai»fe ^enus animal*
. . .  *> vAOOCiii* h.-ai»i Ott i i .U c ;  - A i v i i  j. 1; iA V A A A Uie J f t i V i U ' i & i
eo.r-vpw are roaci.ga, .-kiio tre^e are ta© lire* principles of
11
'.> Owto tis tra tion • 'fc'4'
*  ox’ •ja^vv.4 t . w  -4Ci.*Oi*kivj. j.ua w*w ujr^i.vH^.2 jannot oe 
x.i© reuse v i -  i.oie an aversa! airo tetter
ipw.v#/n w.*m ti *e AOi^wiaA-vQx#. a-»- ae «*am .o cerBQjxolrawe
1..c ac t and potency proposition iron, oar knowledge of order,
-i, v  a * *  n e c e s o i x ^ y  u u  .m o v e  w ^ a I i *  w a x *  . t n o a l e a r i e  c  -  o r d e x *  x t  p r i o r
to a.c a c t  a n d  p o t e n c y  p r o p o a * i i o n a .  it*a t i s ,  o n e  o f  tnese
K.-at co u n d e r  a t o o  ■ a o  i f i r s c  p r i n c i p l e  o r  a c r e  c l o s e l y
x o la te c  to a f i r s t  p r in c ip le  tn a r  t^e o ta e r .
?e must, a t t a is  tim e, attem pt to d iscover w'iat the
i :cc/e o f a f i r s t  p rm cxf Le is .  y ^ r is to t le  aas pointed out
v a  i t  in tn a t .fnicr.. cannot t>: re fe rre d  to an a n te r io r  p r l n *
v- i In -r'. a r to -a.-a fu r th e r  in s ig h t in to  t n i s  a m t t e r ,
1.,a. os v©turn b r ie f ly  co tne w rit in g s  o f o t .  fnowas 4quin&e.
cions
v  - » *  w  d h * ' c i  v a a j t  v A -i a -v V T f  i  i  - i i - c i  i .  p i '  u> t .- - i &  * > *  d v f A s r  r x i i i l u a , .
A,lj’ «■ & •■• I xiX X « il* 1 . i iw y •
^  ib id .  11. > I I  wJU iM if* ; *
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l^norat. aed sunt ab omnibus eodetr; aodo et natural Iter
oognJLta. "12 h© than explains the difference between an
•ndemonstrable principle and a conclusion. If a man la
questioned on scatters closely related to these principles,
• . • respondebit veritatem de his quae aunt 
proplnqua principiis, hablto reapectu ad principlej 
et aie deincepa quousque virtutea priaorum porln- 
clpiorum ad ea de quibua interrogator, applleare 
poteat. Ex uoc igitur manifeate apparet quod per 
principle prima, In eo qul interrogator, eausatur 
cognitlo de novo.^3
Tula snows clearly that ct. Thomas agrees with Aristotle
that the principles are tne cause of the truth of, and are
therefore prior to, the conclusions.
In the above text, St. Tiiomae Indies tea that a
nan can naturally know certain principles free which he
derives his other knowledge, in fact, St. Thooas points
out that it la the knowledge of principles rather than of
conclusions which is west truly natural to mans
Si its esset amass naturalls cognitio concluslonum 
sicut prinoipioruw, eadea esset sententia apud 
oanes de conclusion!bus sicut de principiis* . 
quia quae stmt naturalia, sunt eadea apud oaaies.1*
since, however, not all people agree as to conclusions, but
only as to principles, it follows that principles alone are
12 Saint Thomas Aquinas, S.
Contra Pantiles. Torino /furinTT
1 i # a i f e I o  &ornna hanuailai77 Idber 11, Cap. 83 Jp, 1^7*
13 summa Contra Oentiles. ii, 83 ^ p^. Vjgf.
W  iSiS- ii. 63 3 •  H£7.
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natural to us. *5
Scientific knowledge, then for St, Thomas comes
as a result of our knowledge o f first principles, tne know*
ledge of waxen we nave naturally. ius poxnt here is similar
to Aristotle's. For A r is t o t le ,  s c ie n t i f ic  knowledge demands
a starting point, m  Indemonstrable principle waicn is tl*e
cause of trut<> in all of tne conclusions wnieh fall under
it. This type of knowledge as we nave seen St, Inomas refer
to it, finds Its starting point in Indemonstrable principles
which are naturally known by tne intellect and in turn are
tne cause of tne truth in scientific conclusions.
In addition, as we nave seen in Aristotle, tne
first principles, In order tnat tney may be the cause of
tneir conclusions, must be tne most unleersal, wnicn as we
nave seen entails sieving tne least qualifications, St.
Thomas reiterates this position wnen ne points out tiiat,
Xatellectus igitur, cum sit una vis, est elus 
unuffi naturals obiectum, cuius per se et 
naturaliter cognitlonea nabet, noc autem 
oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur omnia 
ab lntellectu cognitat sicut sub ealore com- 
prenenduntur oanes calores, qul stmt per se 
visibiles. Quod non est allud quaa ens.
Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognescit 
ens, et ea quae stmt per se entis inquantum
Contra Pen tiles, ii, 83 Jp* li^7» By the 
expression"^ natural*, 'at.Yhomas seems to mean that wnieh is 
initially present. This becomes clear from nis references 
to t«e non-natural wnien ' acouirloaus per ld quod est 
naturals:" Tr.e natural is tnat initial •state1' trbm which
*fcae non-natural is produced,
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aolONDodi; in qua cognitiono fondatur primoruffl 
principiorma notitla, ut non e>M auiaul affir- 
mere et neg&re, et alia huluemodi.'10
The above text serves tc point out it, Thomas* 
view of tue nature of first principles. We know because of 
U.e power of our intellect, cue since t;.e intellect is only 
one power, it can have only one proper object. Yet, in 
.mother sense, since all existing things are knowable, all 
ol these things are objects of tne Intellect, hence, the 
one natural object of tne knowing power must at the same 
time contain under it, as it were, all things knowable by 
the intellect, Bit since the Intellect can know all things, 
tne natural object of the Intellect must be that under which 
is contained all things, that is, being. For of all that we 
joiow, being is the most universal. The first principles 
are founded on this knowledge of being, Scientific know­
ledge Is tne result of first principles. St, Thomas refers 
to them as the cause of tue conclusions which fall under 
them. Me states nis own position clearly in the 3 m m  
iheologlae, when he points out that,
kt propter hoc etias circa illas propositiones 
err are non potest, quae statist cognoscuntur 
cognita tertfilnorum quidditate, sicut aceldit 
circa prima principia* ex qulbus etiajs accldlt 
infallibilitas verlt&tis, secundum certitudineia 
sclenti&e, circa conclusiones.*»
^  vontra Gentries. ii, C3 / £ • 1^47*
^  Tbeol. 1# S5, 6, c.
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It is evident from the texts ire have seen that, 
for Aristotle and St. Thomas, truly scientific knowledge 
results from first principles or indemonstrable propositions. 
' nd it is further agreed by these two pnllosophers that 
these principles cannot themselves be reached by demonstra­
tion, nor are they known by some sort of Innate idea or 
concept. Aristotle states that we must arrive at them 
through some inductive process, while St. Thomas declares 
them to be known naturally.
It can be seen from this that the act and potency 
proposition must be either a first principle or a conclu­
sion from some first principle. We must, therefore, inquire 
into our knowledge of being, upon which all first principles 
are related to discover whether either the order proposition 
or the set and potency proposition can be considered a first 
principle or how they can be demonstrated from a first 
principle.
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The solution to the problem with which we are 
concerned in this theele rests in establishing a causal 
relation between potentiality and actuality* It has been 
seen1 that potency and act are related In that we know the 
potency of a thing In terms of some corresponding act| 
i.e. a potency Is always the potency of some specific 
actuality* In this way potency may be said to be related 
to act. It is also clear 2 that this type of a relation­
ship cannot be used to establish a relationship between
effect and cause.
hence w# must go beyond the mere definition of 
the terms ’potency* and *act», to establish whether the 
one is related causally to tne other. To accomplish this, 
let as first consider ..ow v?e come to know potency in a 
a. ill if-;. It is clear tnit xt; regard to all things that we 
know, we must know ti eir activity, for we know the activity 
ci a cnihg fc.-rough xta act.
Now, altnougi. we can nvf a concept of being 
wmc«. can be extended so all tuingc, we cannot say tnat 
ie*iig can be univccaliy predicated of all t u i n g s . 3  For
1 See above, p. 10
* See above, p. lo - 11.
3 see Sms. tVeol. I, 13, 6, c.
41
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a tiling 1» only Insofar as It acts. And the activity of the
ii
thing depends on the form of the thing. That which has not 
the fora of a dog can not have the act of a dog. Or, that 
which »as not the fora of (action can rat actually be in 
motion. Moreover, since nothing exists of which you cannot 
ask the question, *woat is it!*, it is clear that all things 
which are have forms. In fact, it is upon the acquisition 
of a fora that a thing begins to exist. Thus, when one 
animal generates another, another fora is produced, and hence 
another being.** In this sense, fora is the vehicle of being. 
And since a thing is only insofar as it is in activity, 
then fora is also, in this sense, the vehicle of activity.
That which has the fora has the activity. Thus that which 
has the fora of ration has the actual ration. And conversely, 
that which lacks the fora of ration cannot have the ration. 
Now, since all things do not have the sane activity, as for 
Instance, the activity of one animal differs from the acti­
vity of another, then activity cannot be univocally predi­
cated of all things, but must be predicated upon consideration 
of the fora of the thing. Similarly, being, which is in a 
sense dependent on the fora of the thing, cannot be predicated
4 Bee Suraa Contra Qcntllgl, ii.*»5 3 .  14J7. Iffitt 
autea per se consequitur ad foraan.
5 dee Ibid. ill.65 3 *  here St. Thomas mentions 
that man is not the cause of human fora hut is Just the 
cause of the fora cooing to be in matter. Nonetheless, the 
man begins to be when the fora begins to be*
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onlvocally of all things.
Now, that all tilings are net pure being and pure 
act la evident from a study of motion. That things are in 
motion is evident to the senses. As Aristotle has said!
"the existence of motion is asserted by all who have any* 
thing to say about nature."6 Against tne objection of the 
skeptic who eight say that there is no motion, there seees 
to be no argument.? Motion is not an assuaption that need 
be proved. It is rather a faet that need merely be 
recognized.
Now from the faet that things are in notion, it 
is evident that things ehange. Motion is between contraries. 
That whleh is in notion oust move from something to sooe- 
thing. And that fro® which it ooves cannot be identified 
with that to which it neves, for in this case it is 
obvious that there would be no motion. But since notion, 
as has already been pointed out, is evident, it follows that 
motion must involve contraries.^
g
A notion from one contrary to another is a change. 
In every ehange new fora is acquired. For example, when a
6 Ihya. vlii.l (250b 15 j.
7 **• i!£§* U&*b 25 - 185a 7).
8
See Ibid. v.5 (22$?& 30 - 229b 9).
• Ibid. v.5 (229a 3u). "Motion is a change Cron a 
particular subject to a particular subject."
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
44
man*a hair changes froo black to gray, the fora of grayness 
x*eplaees the fora of blackness. Similarly, when something 
lasgins to move, it acquires a new fora of motion and loses 
the fora associated with rest. Something in motion is eon* 
binually acquiring and losing forms as it changes its 
position, for a thing is and acts through its fora, and to 
acquire a new activity is to acquire a new fora. But to 
acquire motion, or to be in motion, demands the acquisition 
of a new activity for the activity of a body in motion is 
different from the activity of a body at rest. Moreover, 
the activity of a mover changes as the mover aoves, and, 
:iince the position of the mover is always changing, the 
mover must be continually acquiring and losing forms in 
relation to its position. Consequently, it follows that 
motion necessitates the acquisition of a fora, and, there­
fore, motion is a change.
tet us now examine the process of change. Change, 
as we have already seen, involves contraries in that it is 
always from something to something. As Aristotle has 
pointed out, a thing changes insofar as it is capable of 
changing. In this sense ehange involves potency. For a 
change is movement from potency to aot.*Q An exaaple of 
this can be found in the examination of the thing which 
changes fro® the state of rest to the state of motion.
ilH2* fheol. I, 2, 3, e. Jfrlam Via?.
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because the thing has changed from rest to aotion, ire can 
say that this thing while it was at the state of rest, was 
capable of notion, that is, potentially in notion.
We cannot deduce froro this knowledge, however, 
that the thing must have been acted upon in order that it 
be actually In motion.11- For to say that a thing is poten­
tially in motion is to say that It is capable of acquiring 
a new fora. To say that it is actually in motion means only 
that it actually possesses this form. From our knowledge of 
potency based on change alone, there seems to be no principle 
causally relating potency to act.
We must go beyond this first impression of potency
to discover how a thing in potency can be reduced to act.
It is clear that nothing has a potency for ail things. For 
all beings which change are limited as to that which they
can become. An animal, for instance, without wings, has no
potency to fly. Hor has a fish the capability of breathing. 
In this sense it is clear that the potencies of things axe 
limited. And, by limited we mean not limited in the sense 
of a potency not being fulfilled because of some external
Etienne ailson, Yhe Christian Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas, trmns. C l .  Shook, C.&.& (iiew¥ork, 1956) • 
Wilson considers motion in terms of act and potency, 
particularly in his discussion of the Friwa Via* His 
discussion, however, seems to be of lifflevalue to this 
work. Rather than being critical, it simply appears to be 
a re-statement of what dt. Thomas says. The act and 
potency proposition is not questioned here but seems to be 
accepted on Its face value. (See pp. 59-60)*
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power preventing Its fulfilment, such as Inactive senses 
might prevent the fulfilment of the potency of the Intel*
Leot; we mean rather the limitations of the thing itself, 
for as we have seen there are certain things for which sooe 
beings have no potency*
It follows frota what has been said that the 
potentiality of the thing is deteralned by its nature. The 
reasons for this can be more clearly seen in the following.
Ail things act according to their nature. A dog acts as a 
dog because it is its nature to do so. A M  because the 
nature is limited to *dog*, a dog has no potency to take 
on the activity proper to another animal, how, with regard 
to a Ming which is in act, to know the nature of the 
thing is the sane as to know the activity.12 In relation 
to motion, when the nature of a thing in notion is under* 
stood, its activity is also understood.
Nature is not, however, simply expressive of the 
activity. For, as we have seen, things are not always in 
activity. A boy, for Instance, is not actually an adult 
since he lacks the accidental fora required to beeoae an adult. 
He is, however, potentially an adult because it is his 
nature to become one. Mature, in this sense, is expressive 
of the end of the thing. That Is, to know the nature of
12 See above, p. 12.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
47
the thing is not merely to know the activity of thing, but 
it is also to know the potentiality of the thing.*3
How we have seen that a thing can change only 
insofar as it is capable of ciianging. It la also clear 
that that to which the potency of the thing extends Is 
deteralned by its nature, nature is, in this way, the 
cause of the change in the thing. It exercises causality 
In that it is according to it that the thing changes.
Mature, as the cause of the potentiality of the tiling, is, 
in a way, the cause of the reduction of potency to act.
A hoy becones a nan because it is his nature to do so. In 
this sense, nature is the cause of changes change is the 
moveaent ftroa potency to act; that which is in potency is 
capable of being in act, and is deteralned to certain sets 
because of the nature of the thing, as a heavy body, be­
cause of its nature, is potentially in downward Motion; 
since that which the thing is capable of besetting is deter­
mined by nature, then the basoning or change is in this way 
caused by nature.
Mature is the cause of all activity insofar as 
it orders the activity of ail things, for order scans simply 
suat ail things act according to their natures. It is in 
this way that order is related to naturea all things neve
*3 Metaph. v.4 (1015a 17}• “And nature in this sense
is the source of aoveaent of natural objects, being present 
in thea soaehow, either potentially or in coaplete reality.**
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aeoordijig to their natures} and since all thins* wove 
according to their nature, nature is a cans# of notion of 
tilings* Mature docs not cause the notion itself hut rather 
causes the ordering of the motion.3^
In terms of activity and potency, this can he 
explained as felloes. A thing is in activity insofar as 
it possesses the fora of the activity} a thing is in 
potency insofar as it is capable of possessing the fore of 
the activity. Mow we have already seen that tne poten­
tiality of the thing is determined by its nature. In this 
sense, the acquisition of a new form, that is the reduction 
from potency to activity, is caused by the nature. Mow 
the nature itself does not supply the fora which is acquired 
in a Change, but rather directs the thing which undergoes 
change as a final cause.^
It may be argued that a motion can be caused in 
respect to finality and uncaused in respect to efficiency} 
i.e. that tne same motion can be at the same tine caused 
and uncaused in respect to different causes. For example, 
when we perceive any ordered motion, of which an efficient
** l£22* viii.l (252a 12;. ", . . nature is everywhere
tne cause of order.
^  hetaph. v.t (lul^a lu;. here nature is identified 
with essence as the "end of the process of becoming.*
Nature by directing the thing to its end, acts as a final 
cause; i.e. the end of every natural change is the fulfil­
ment of the nature.
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lt> diioj in pro, .nan, "T;.c ; aminy. of Mature," fae Ihoalst.
i ...a, <pp. 3^3-^wlj• Xn tiiia article^ it is seen timfc 
f ■■■''sc acr: be ,t number of Kesnin-^s of ti.e f orr, ’nature •. 
it is concluded, ticlever, tnat in every instance, "nature 
if’ considered . . . In one \-my or anotaer no principle of 
fiovementU fioreover, insofar as the nature determines 
tan motion to an end, it la also the cause of isoveosent.
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CHAPTER SU
Concerning m m  vxew tn&t it is possible tiiat a 
uaing in motion may tiave no efficient cause whatsoever, let 
us examine tie classical objection formulated in tne philo­
sophy of David rfurae, In £ treatise on nuaan jNature. one of 
tne central themes is causality.
name begins tne treatise with an explanation of 
itaaan Knowledge,
All perceptions of tne nuaan Kind resolve 
themselves into two distinct Kinds, which i 
snail call impressions and Ideas. The differ­
ence betwixt these consists in the degrees of 
force and liveliness, with which they strike 
upon the mini, and make their way into our 
thought or consciousness, those perceptions 
which enter with most force and violence, we 
may name impressionsi and, under this name, X 
comprehend all' our sensations, passions, and 
emotions, as they make their first appearance 
in tne soul* By ideas. X mean the faint images 
of these in thinking ami reasoning . •
To clarify the relationship between impressions and ideas,
■ie later adds,
. , , that all our simple ideas In their first 
appearance, are deriv1J from simple impressions, 
which are correspondent to the®, and which they 
exactly represent.2
In U ixe .-;ay a ores est&bilaaed tne fact that all of 
axx ia«ut are related to impressions* Taey are, In fact.
1 David H m m ,  n Treatise of human nature, sd. D* A * 
-e lb y —lilggs ^DxfoXvi, X, - r & T T r
2 ibid. i, i, i g .  4 7 .
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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distinguished as different kinds of perception merely 
because of their vivacity and because tne one is always 
prior to the o th e r .3 Although impressions ari ideas can be 
distinguished in this way, there is a more important way 
in which they are related to each other: 5,Ihat idea of red
wnica we form in the dark, and that impression which strikes 
our eye in sunshine, differ only in degree, not in nature.** 
r^ous this it is clear that tiume's ideas are related to his 
impressions as an image is related to a sensation. These 
impressions and ideas make up as we have seen, "all the per­
ceptions of the human mind.*
When examining the content of the mind, we some­
times find that the representation of an impression "retains 
a considerable degree of Its first vivacity." This leads 
home to posit the existence of the memory, which "preserves 
tne original forts in which its objects were presented. "5 
ft second principle, wnich finds in the mind, is the imagi­
nation to which he gives the liberty "to transpose and 
cuarige its ideas,
" . . .  All simple ideas may be separated by the 
iisagination and may be united again in what form it
3 I, I, I Jp. 27.
* ibid. i, i, i j>. 37.
& JM2* 1X13 • 17*
6 Ibid. I, I, III yj. 1&7.
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p le a s e s ." ?  Concerning th is  s e p a ra tio n  and uniting of ideas, 
hums points out th a t  chance a lo n e  could not account for 
t h is .  There is, behind t h is  a c t i v i t y ,  a 'uniting principle* 
which acts as a ’’g e n tle  fo rc e "  on the imagination. The 
fo rc e  behind the uniting of ideas acts according to certain 
q u a l i t ie s  by which the ideas a re  related*
The qualities, froej which this association 
arises, and by which the mind is after this 
manner convey'd free one idea to another, are 
three, vis. Resemblance, Contiguity in tine or 
place, and Cause and effect.®
it is the relation of our Ideas in terns of cause and
effect that we must now consider.
While the resemblance and contiguity of ideas are 
relations that lead nowhere, with regard to cause and effect 
triere is *a necessary connexion to be taken into consider­
ation." The problem which home sets up for aimseif, then, 
is* "For what reason *c pronounce it necessary, that
everything whose existence has a beginning, should also 
have a c a u s e ." '
hums answers the problem in this ways
But here is an argument, which proves at 
once, that the foregoing proposition is neither 
intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We can 
never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to
7 Hur^ » I# I# xv 3 *  *h7«
6 ibid. i, i, v i  3 *  117.
J Ibid. I, ij.1, IX 3 • 7j§7*
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©very new existence, or new modification of 
existence, without shewing at the sane time the 
impossibility tnere is, tn&t any thing can ever 
begin to exist without some productive prin­
ciple | and where the latter proposition cannot 
be proved, we must despair of ever being able 
to prove tne former.*^
.t.urse points out that ao^e philosophers argue that since all 
objects come into existence at a certain tiae and in a cer­
tain place, there must be some cause to fix its beginning 
in time and place, or else it will always remain in "eternal 
suspense," He asks, however,
Is there any tsore difficulty in supposing the 
tine and place to be fix*d without a cause, 
than to suppose the existence to be determined 
in that manner? The first question that occurs 
on this subject is always, whether the object 
shall exist or not; The nexi/wnen and where 
it shall begin to exist. If the removal o f a  
cause be intuitively absurd in tne one case, 
it must be so in the other* And if th-\t 
absurdity be not clear without a proof in the one 
case, it will equally require one in the 
other.**
That is, in order to use space and time to demonstrate that 
»very thing which begins to exist must nave a cause, it must 
also be demonstrated that time and place nave a cause. Since 
the latter can be supposed to be fixed without a cause, then 
tne former may also be supposed to be uncaused.
Similarly, if it is argued that, if the existence 
of a thing is not caused by another, then it must be caused
iiume, I, III, III 2p. W *
11 I*>ld. I* ill* X U  3 *  327*
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
5 *
by i t s e l f ,  Hume r e p l ie s ;
But to say that anything i s  produced, or to 
express myself sort properly, comes Into 
existence, without a cause, I s  not to affir® 
that *tls Itself its own cause) But on the 
contrary in excluding a l l  external causes, 
exeludos a fortiori the thing Itself which is 
created. An object, that exists absolutely 
without any cause, certainly is not its own 
cause| and when you assert, that the one fol­
lows from the other, you suppose the very point 
i n  question, and talcs it for granted, tiuit *tis 
utterly iapesslfele any thing ean ever begin to 
exist without a cause, but that, upon the 
exclusion of one productive principle, we mast 
still nave recourse to another,12
Those who hold this position are, according to Hume, evading 
the  real problem. Hume's position is, then, that the pro­
position "that nothing can ever begin to exist without some 
productive principle," cannot be demonstrated.^
In regard to the aet and potency proposition, it 
i s  c le a r  that It f a l l s  against the argument of Hume. Botn 
the proposition against which Hume is arguing and the act 
and potency proposition state that prior to any change in 
the activity of anything there must exist some tiling which
12 Hume, I, III, III 8l7.
*3 ft number of Thomiats take refuge in this argument, 
Dardell, for instance, states that all we must do is con­
sider the logical possibilities of "whatever is moved"t 
in this ease, he states, three possibilities avail them- 
selvesj that "whatever Is moved* is moved by nature alone, 
or by itself alone, or by nature and by itself simul­
taneously. Although this is a valid reconstruction of 
at. Thomas' argument, it nevertheless fails to take into 
account this cogent objection of Hume, dee H. D. dardell,
O.P*. Introduction to the Philosophy of Ht. Thomas Aoulnas. 
trans. "Jolm A T m o T ^ ^ u l s , ”’ l f P ) 7 V T l # r ^  -----
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in causally responsible for that change. Therefore, If 
home*a objection is valid, the act and potency proposition 
cannot be demonstrated•**
Bow then, are we to regard the demonstration of 
this principle as given in the previous chapter? This 
demonstration, stated simply, argues that because the acti­
vity of all things is toward an end deteralned by their 
n a tu re , the act and potency proposition must hold true, at 
least in regard to final causality. Hues argues that we 
cannot know that any particular activity demands a cause, 
Tne explanation for this obvious contradiction lies in the 
fact that Hume refuses to take into consideration an all
^  Brother Benignus has an Interesting objection 
against the Humeian position that things night be "naturally 
in notion without any cause of their motion. Bis position 
is based on the idea that such a statement contradicts 
Aristotle*a definition of notions it "wist deny that 
notion is the continuing actualization of potency". Although 
hose hiaself does not speak of notion in terns of potency 
ami act, a "Huneian" position night be stated in those terns,
i.e. notion is the actualization of potency without a cause. 
In other words, Buna's position would sinply state that a 
being can nova fro* potency to act without the aid of any 
being in act. Brother Benlgxtns* objection then is nothing 
else than the assumption of the validity of the act and 
potency proposition, an assumption we have seen, which is 
not necessarily justified. See Brother Benignus, F.S.C.,
(Hew fork, 19*7), P. 80.
The Metaphysics of St. Thomas 
leg p p f % S I& r  ~lteifc errs in 
the saae way. Against the objection that there might be no 
causality, he assumes a causal relationship between potency 
and act which is true tut cannot be demonstrated. It is 
clear that neither of these objections solve the problem 
set up by Hume.
Mature
Aquinas. (Milwaukee, 195®)
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Important premise: that the activity of a thing la deter­
mined by the nature of the thing.
To aay that activity is determined by nature 
indicates that the nature of a thing ean be known. To know 
the nature of a thing is to know that towards which the 
activity of the thing necessarily tends. For instance, when 
we say that fire necessarily produces heat, we purport to 
have some understanding of the nature of fire. According to 
St, Tnomas, because things are naturally determined to some 
ends, man nay, in a limited way, predict the future.*5 
hence, to know the nature of the thing, is to knew the final 
cause of the activity of the thing.
It is this very knowledge of the nature of the
thing that Hume will net allow:
There is no object, which implies the existence 
of any other if we consider these objects in 
themselves, and never look beyond the ideas 
which we form of them.10
There cannot be, for Hume, a certain knowledge of a thing
as directed towards an end. Since no idea considered in
itself implies anything else, then there is no basis in
home for talking about things as natures. To speak of a
thing as a nature must be in terms of its finality, aid
^  JSS* Theol. i, 86, t, e. "Sed prout sunt in suis
cauala. cogaosSObaaunt etiam a nobis. slisiQuidem..
in suis caucic slnt ut ex qulbus ex necessitate pfovenlant. 
eoiwwuntiir p w  w t l t y i M .  .al.ntl.ej »iw. ..fcrolaci. 
praccognoaclt ecilpsim futuran." This could also apply 
to’ predicting th&fcheatwiii oe produced by fire.
Hume, I, III, VI Jp. ^7.
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c-.iurefore, in terns of something w»iica it «aay not actually 
a vc. hence, to lenow a no tars ’.a also to know, by neoes- 
ry irapiication, an end or, in torus, another
c -latence* It uant be cone . .4 n- . tnen 1 1 nt tne j*/rIii ngs of 
* bear oat */■ > - . »v- — ^rtU»v >oos i^ ot * *• l»i-X2ige a3
.v.nj natures, 0 1 , u t least, j«s does not act as though we
t  serve no v-s pome **ere to attem pt to
n gue against Hume's position as such. The difference l i e s  
;.n tae very principles o f philosophy. nature must be seen  
„ii things and accepted, i f  i t  is  not seen or accepted no 
amount o f argumentation w i l l  ortaiige tale. Ue mu3t conclude, 
s.herefore, that insofar as it aas been shown that ev ery  
movement fro® potency to act a as a final ca use, Hume's 
iuguieent has no bearing.
It does, tiowever, nave a bearing on whether an 
•a c t iv ity  may take p lace  wituout there being  an e f f i c i e n t  
cause, What Hume nas r e a l l y  pointed out i s  th e  f a c t  th a t  
tn ere  is  a real p o s s ib i l i ty  o f an activity be ing  uncaused, 
he does not prove that any a c t iv i t y  is  in  fact uncaused, but 
cic/iy indicates tiu*t i t  might be uncaused, hence, i t  
re?--ains to  discuss whether a change which moves tow ards a 
natural end cm; be random with reference to an e f f i c i e n t
s-t tiii 0 *
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In  o rd er to  show th a t  f i n a l  c a u s a lity  cannot 
o p e ra te  w ith o u t e f f i c i e n t  c a u s a li ty ,  i t  is  f i r s t  necessary  
to  go more d eep ly  in to  tne n a tu re  o f  f i n a l  c a u s a l i ty ,  We 
have seen th a t  th in g s  which move move towards some end.
Ana we have a ls o  seen tn a t  th is  end i s  tne  f i n a l  cause o f  
tn e  m otion . How, th en , does the  end, o r f i n a l  cause, e f f e c t  
th a t  which is  in  m otion? We nave seen tn a t  th e  answer to  
th is  q u e s tio n  i s  th a t  th e  f i n a l  cause g iv e s  o rd e r to  the  
m otion. I t  rem ains , however, to  determ ine th e  way in  which 
order i s  g iv e n  to  the  th in g  th a t  i s  In  m otion . I t  would 
seem th a t  th e  e f f e c t  o f  f i n a l  c a u s a lity  could  be a d eq u a te ly  
expressed here by the  term  • d i r e c t io n 1, *  The f i n a l  cause, 
as the end o f  the a c t i v i t y ,  e f fe c ts  tne m otion by g iv in g  i t  
d ir e c t io n .  Thus in  th e  case o f  a p r o je c t i l e ,  such as an 
arrow, i t  i s  th e  ta rg e t  r a t t ie r  than  the a rc h e r which Is  most 
p ro p e rly  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  I t s  d i r e c t io n .
I t  can be argued nere  th a t  s ince tn e  a rc h e r is  
quite o b v io u s ly  re s p o n s ib le  fo r  the  p ro je c t in g  o f  th e  arrow
*  dine© a i l  m otion is  to  a p a r t ic u la r  end (see p , hj) 
tusn the  e f f e c t  o f  th e  f i n a l  cause may be considered as 
•d ir e c t in g *  the  m otion o f  th e  th in g  to  I t s  proper end.
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he is also responsible for tne direction. In addition, it 
wouli see# that in certain cases, for instance if the archer 
a hot the arrow blindly in the air, when there le no intended 
end, the archer surely must be solely responsible for the 
direction of the arrow.
Against this argument, it suet be pointed out that 
even leaving aside the causality of the archer, this does not 
man that there is no final causality involved in such an 
action. It must be remembered that the arrow is not simply 
an instrument of the archer. That is, the arrow is itself 
an entity,2 and as such, has a nature of its own. Conse­
quently, the end of the notion of the arrow will be accor­
ding to the nature of the arrow. That is, because of its 
nature as arrow, an arrow in notion follows a certain path.
It follows that, the end of a moving arrow is that to which 
the arrow according to its nature tends. Furthermore, it 
tan be seen that to achieve its end the arrow naturally 
assumes a certain direction. In this way, then, it is clear 
that that which is nest responsible for the direction of a 
notion is the end or the final cause. In the ease where the 
archer aims the a. row at a target, it is a matter of the 
archer using the arrow as an instrument, attempting to 
project the arrow in such a way so that that at which he is
2 In reality, the end of the motion of the arrow must 
always be considered in relation to the end of the archer. 
However, if you consider only the arrow Itself, as a thing 
in motion, It still is in motion towards an end.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
6 o
aiming and the cna of the natural movement of the arm* 
coincide. It foliowo, therefore, that the final c&uae 
affects the thing in motion, by giving direction to ita 
motion.
In regard to what has been said stove, that the 
final cause is responsible for the direction of the notion, 
the following problem arises. Can the final cause be respoa* 
sible for the direction without being the efficient cause 
of the motion? That is, to cause direction is. In a sense, 
to cause motion; to direct is to move. And in this sense, 
the final cause actually becomes an efficient cause. In 
answer to this problem, it would appear to be perfectly true 
to assert that that which actually directs a motion Is an 
efficient cause, however, we must here make a distinction 
between direction and directing. The final cause, as the 
end of the motion is the cause of the direction of the motion. 
This final cause, uowever, qua final cause must by its nature 
lack efficacy. Hence the final cause cannot itself be the
k
cause of the directing of the thing. In order, therefore, 
that a thing in motion assume a direction towards its end 
it must be directed to this end by an efficient cause.
3 Every physical thing, because of its size and shape, 
will assume a motion which is proper to it, or natural.
^ bee Metaoh. xli.6 (1072b *t). "The final cause, then, 
produces motion as being loved.* It cannot therefore be 
confused with moving cause.
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Arid It la in this way that we see the necessary 
coincidence of final and efficient causality. As we have 
seen, efficient causality by itself can only account far 
random motion. And we have further seen in the proceeding 
paragraph that while final causality can account for the 
direction of the notion, it lacks the efficacy to itself 
direct the motion.^
Thus, it follows that in every Instance of a 
thing moving towards an end, there must be present both 
final and efficient causality* For as soon as the motion 
of the moving thing assumea a direction towards an end, 
final causality becomes evident. The final cause can only 
be responsible for this direction as a final cause* That 
is, it lacks the efficacy to itself move the thing In any 
direction. Therefore, it necessarily follows that a notion 
which has direction cannot be due entirely to the final 
cause of the notion.
Moreover, frota this it may be concluded that there 
is an efficient cause for all motion, for, it has been seen 
that in every motion which assumes a direction towards an 
end, there oust tr something which has the efficacy to 
direct the sotion towards the end. And that which gives
** m * 2 (202a 9). We have already seen that an
object in notion is continually acquiring new foras.
Although this thing moves ’for the sake of’ an end this end 
cannot give the form: "The mover or agent Efficient cause7
will always be the vehicle of a fora."
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the thing the motion towards the end is the efficient cause. 
There is, however, no Instance of motion which is not di­
rected towards an end,*> For, a s  we have seen, all things 
o p e r a t e  according to their natures. Bat, to operate ac­
c o r d i n g  to a nature is to stove towards an end. Thus, only 
t h i n g s  which a r e  not natures could be capable of moving in 
random motion, i t  i s  evident, however, that there can be 
no t h i n g  Which i s  n o t  a  nature; for all motion is ordered 
a n d  intelligible, and, m  Aristotle has shown, order demands 
nature.^ There can b e ,  therefore, no such thing as random 
motion, that is, uncaused notion, either in terns of finality 
o r  efficiency.
Further, it can be seen that with respect to both 
efficiency and finality the notion is on*?.® That is, the 
directing of the notion, and the direction of the motion, and 
the aotion itself, are all one. From this it can be seen 
t h a t  there must be a relationship between the final and effi­
cient cause. And it can further be seen that the first cause
6 sutaBa Contra Gentiles. 111.3 /p. 2257. "Omnls actio
4WWWHWWMHMSMM* 4SV* WM W M M N M W H W M I M i i e M M W W S M * ’
ot sot us eat propter aliouaa perfectionec.
7 see above, p. 17*
S JSjjro. Theol. I, 44, 4, c. "£at autea idem finis
ngentia et oatientls. Inquantua huluaaodl. sea sifter et
~aiter: uhu^ eniro ei Idem est auod aitens iniendlt
recipere. * ' '...~r''"r * 1.1 1
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of motion la the final cause. That Is, the final cause 
causes the efficient cause to cause the activity.5
The necessity of efficient and final causality 
and their interrelation is seen quite clearly In the example 
given above— * in the case of the arc! »r shooting the arrow 
at the target. The archer Is obviously the efficient cause 
and the target is the final cause. The presence of the end 
isoves the efficient cause to put the object In motion.
There are, however, other cases in which the causality Is 
not quite so evident. X will discuss briefly two of these.
The first of these is generationi that is, the 
coming to be of a thing, for example, an animal. In gen­
eration, the first thing which is obvious is that one animal 
produces anotheri that is, the parent is the efficient cause 
of its offspring. What is not so evident, however, is the 
final cause of the end of generation. In regard to this 
problem there are two possible solutions. Tim one is that 
that which is first produced, the fetus, is the end of the 
act of generation. The other is that the fully grown mature 
a.iimal is the end* If we say that the end of generation in 
animals is the fetus, then we must explain the change from 
fetus to maturity. Timt is, we must explain this latter 
change in terms of efficient and final causality. What is
^ ^h”»a Contra Pantiles. ili.1T M ,  "Finis inter
alia. <*m ». nrUatow obtlnafc. «t *b T w o  oww. alia. o a u w
habent quod sint causae in actut aaens onin non salt nisi 
pro&ter ranch.4  ' "' '.tv ' -■ .......
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t n e  final cause; t h a t  is, w h a t  gives direction to the 
growth? It is evident from sense observation that that to 
waich all animals naturally tend is maturity* In other words 
a puppy grows into a nature dog, a calf into a cow, etc.
That, then which gives direction to growth is fulfilment, 
taat is a fulfilled nature.
What Is the efficient cause of growth; that is, 
what is the efficient cause of the fetus growing to maturity? 
Could it be the food and nutrition which appear to be a 
cause of growth? This does not appear likely because there 
is no apparent relationship between nutrition as an effi­
cient cause and maturity as a final cause. In this sense, 
the growth imparted by the nutrient would be seemingly random 
as was the motion of tne arrow shot blindly by the archer 
seemingly random. In the latter case, however, the nature 
c f  the arrow prevented the motion from being random. Could 
this argument be applied to tne case under consideration?
Xiiat is, could it be that the nature of the fetus directs the 
growth given by the nutrients toward maturity?
To answer this question it must be remembered that 
the mature animal is a fulfilled or complete animal, and 
taat a fetus is, in this sense, only an incomplete animal.
It follows from this that the nature of a fetus is also in­
complete. The nature of a fetus stands to the nature of the
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mature animal a s  a  being i n  potency to a  being in act* 
T u t - r e f o r e ,  the nature of t n e  fetus cannot be a cause of the 
growth to maturity. Tnat is, since the fetus is only poten­
tially fulfillei, it cannot b e  responsible for its own ful­
filment. It follows therefore, tn&t since tne fetus cannot 
direct Itself towards maturity, that which produces the 
fetus m u s t  itself direct it towards maturity* Therefore the 
e n d  o f  generation is the mature animal. The fetus, rather 
titan being the end of generation, is, in a sense, the be­
g i n n i n g  of generation* The generator, which is actually 
fulfilled, directs the fetus, which is potentially fulfilled, 
t o w a r d s  actual fulfilment* The growth from fetus to fulfil­
ment is, in this sense, one motion imparted by the generator 
s - t n  tne fulfilled animal nature a s  the end*
The second difficulty wnich will be discussed here 
i s  t h a t  of circular or rotary motion. Let us take for example 
Wie motion of the moon around the eartn* It is clear that 
t h e  moon is moved according to its nature by a final cause*
Tiia problem here is that the motion of this body is appar­
ently uncaused, i.e. not efficiently caused. Could this not 
be a  case of a thing in motion which is not moved by another? 
In light of what we have said, this cannot be true. A body 
moving in such a manner is continually assuming new directions 
and new positions* But that to which the body is tending, as 
a final e&uae lacks the efficiency to be itself solely respon­
sible for these changes* There must, therefore, be an
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efficient cause of t h e s e  changes. However, It might toe 
o b j e c t e d  that the motion of the moon, toeing circular, is tbs 
end of its natural tiy&t is, tiiat the motion is the activity 
of the moon. In this ease, however, there would toe no 
eaunge, i.e. no movement from potency to act since the 
i.otion would be fcue end of the talng. What we would have 
h e r e  w o u l d  b e  motion but without changej that Is there would 
be no transition from potency to a c t .  It can be seen, there­
fore, that even if motion a n d  end are one, a highly unlikely 
position, the act and potency proposition remains true; no 
b e i n g  In potency can toe reduced to act except toy a being in 
a c t .
In conclusion, it has been established that the 
a c t  and potency proposition m u s t  toe true in order to explain 
m o t i o n .  And i t  can toe seen f u r t h e r  that t h i s  proposition 
can n o t  properly toe regarded a s  a principle, in that it can 
be demonstrated. It follows from this that one should be 
able to arrive at t h i s  conclusion through a scientific demon­
stration. That is, beginning with certain truths one should, 
tarough the use of the syllogism arrive at the act and potency 
proposition as % conclusion.
The argument may be put in syllogistic form. We 
are attempting to snow that every motion requires tooth a 
final and an efficient cause. We will begin toy demonstrating 
the necessity of a final cause. From observation we see that
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ev*2ry motion Is a change. And we see also that every cnange
is orderly:
A Avery change is orderly
Every isotion Is a on&nge 
Therefore, Every motion is orderly
By observing the way in which tilings operate, it
i'o evident that order is caused by the nature of the thing.
And in the same way, it is clear that nature tends towards
■in end:
B Everything natural tends towards an end
Every orderly motion is natural 
Therefore, Every orderly motion tends towards an end
By using the conclusion from syllogism A as the
minor premise and the conclusion frost syllogism B as tne
major premise:
c Every orderly motion is to an end (Conel. of 3^
Every motion is orderly motion (Conel. of Ay
Therefore, Every motion is to an end
Bit the end of a motion is, by definition, the
final cause:
D Every end is a final cause
Every motion is to an end (Conel. of C)
Therefore, Every motion has a final cause
Xt is concluded, therefore, that every motion has
a final cause. Moreover, by definition again, it is k n o w n
that every reduction from potency to act is a motion.
Therefore, the following demonstration is true:
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...very motion has a final cause (Conel. of D) 
Every reduction from potency to act is a 
motion
Therefore, Every reduction from potency to act has a 
final cause
Therefore, tnat no being in potency can be reduced to act 
except by a being in act is demonstrated scientifically in 
relation to final causality.
It remains then, to demonstrate that every re­
action from potency to act has an efficient cause. We 
cegin by observing the fact that every ordered motion is in 
a direction;
F Every orderly motion is in a direction
Every motion is orderly notion (Conel.of A)
Therefore, Every motion is in a direction
v/e have furthex- seen by a dialectical argument that direction
requires a director. That is, in order that a tiling assure
a direction there must be something which has the efficacy
to move it in that direction;
3 Everything with direction has an efficient
cause
Every motion has direction (Conel. of F) 
Therefor®, Every motion has an efficient cause
ind it follows from this therefore, as in syllogism fi, that
every reduction from potency to act has an efficient cause.
In this way trie basic objection as voiced by Hume
and others is answered. There is no way in which a motion
could exist without having an efficient and a final cause.
dinoe all motion assumes a direction towards an end, it is
quite clear that all motion has a final cause, however.
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linco f i n a l  c a u s a l i t y  cannot itself b© responsible for the 
i r e c t i o n  because it l a c k s  t n e  efficacy to Impart motion, 
c ten a l l  motion need® an efficient as well as a final cause* 
* n d  since all m o t i o n  is a reduction fro® potency to act it 
necessarily f o l l o w s  t h a t  *no being in potency can be r©» 
r a c e d  to act except by a being in act *.
The proposition is therefore true and can be 
;ec;;or*3trated. It is necessary but not per so nota. It may 
be itself used In demonstration, for as we have seen, a 
true proposition in a premise lead© to a true conclusion.
And because of this, the act and potency proposition, since 
it i s  Itself expressive of order must assume an important 
r o l e  ir* any philosophy of order.
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